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The Expanding Scope of Human Rights
in a Technological World—Using the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights
to Establish a Minimum Data Protection
Standard across Latin America
Josiah Wolfson*
Privacy is a human right that many in the world do not enjoy.
The failure of many countries to prioritize privacy through
the passage and enforcement of comprehensive data protection laws has left their citizens vulnerable. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights should use its authority to set a
minimum data protection standard for its Member States.
This Note discusses the historical development of data protection, the current data protection gap in Latin America,
and proposes the role that the Inter-American Court of Human Rights should play in advancing a minimum data protection standard in the region.
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SECTION I: INTRODUCTION
My Jewish grandfather was living in Nazi-occupied Europe with
his sister and parents in the late 1930s. With the rise of anti-Semitism in the region, his father decided that the family would leave

190

INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:3

everything in search of a better life in the United States. One morning, my grandfather and his family went to the train station to begin
the journey out of Europe. However, after officials at the train station reviewed their database of records, the officials refused to grant
my family passage because Jews were banned from leaving the city.
The Nazi Reich had partnered with International Business Machines
(IBM), a privately owned census tabulating company, to systematically identify the Jews living in Europe and created a card sorting
system that assisted the Nazis in the technological “automation of
human destruction.”1
After the allies won World War II, many IBM executives were
prosecuted for their roles in collecting and synthesizing the Jewish
populations’ personal data.2 The conclusion of the war ended the use
of personal databases to discriminate against Jews, but the stored
information in the databases was never destroyed.3 The perils surrounding the unwanted use of people’s personal information is
something many around the world still face today. Millions of people living in Latin America4 remain at risk of private and public entities collecting, processing, and misusing their personal information
because those governments have failed to implement comprehensive data protection laws.5 In light of this human right gap, the Inter1

EDWIN BLACK, IBM AND THE HOLOCAUST: THE STRATEGIC ALLIANCE
BETWEEN NAZI GERMANY AND AMERICA’S MOST POWERFUL CORPORATION 8
(2001); see also Marc Langheinrich, Privacy by Design — Principles of PrivacyAware Ubiquitous Systems, SWISS FEDERAL INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY,
http://graphics.stanford.edu/~bjohanso/csd2003-ispace/lanheinrich-privacy.pdf
(last visited Nov. 26, 2015); see, e.g., VICTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER, DELETE:
THE VIRTUE OF FORGETTING IN A DIGITAL AGE (Princeton, 2009) (reporting that
the Nazis used the information contained in the comprehensive Dutch Registry
database to identify, deport, and murder a higher percentage (73%) of the Dutch
Jewish population than other nations that did not maintain similar databases).
2
See BLACK, supra note 1, at 6-15.
3
Id.
4
For purposes of this Article, Latin America includes all countries in the
Americas, spanning from Mexico down to Argentina.
5
Camila Tobón, Data Privacy in Latin America: An Overview, 44 no. 2
ABA INT’L LAW NEWS 1, 6 (2015) (asserting that Bolivia, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Honduras, and Venezuela have yet to pass domestic data protection laws); see
DLA PIPER’S GLOBAL DATA PROTECTION AND PRIVACY TEAM, DATA
PROTECTION LAWS OF THE WORLD, http://dlapiperdataprotection.com/#handbook/world-map-section/c1_HN (last visited Nov. 26, 2015) [hereinafter DLA
PIPER] (providing state by state comparison of data protection laws around the
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American Court of Human Rights (“IACtHR”) should use its authority, pursuant to the American Convention on Human Rights
(“American Convention”), to establish a minimum data protection
standard across Latin America.6
Data protection laws generally require that the data controller7
meet applicable conditions to store, process, or distribute personal8
or sensitive9 data about the data subject.10 However, no data protection law is absolute in its protection of the data subject, and instead
“must be considered in relation to [the law’s] function in society.”11

world); see also Aldo M. Leiva, Data Protection Law in Spain and Latin America:
Survey of Legal Approaches, 41 no. 4 ABA INT’L LAW NEWS 6 (2012).
6
It is impossible to analyze this multifaceted issue from a macro perspective
without generalizing my critique of the region as a whole. However, each Latin
American country is unique and has made differing efforts to protect individual’s
data through domestic regulations or the absence thereof. See generally
PERMANENT COUNCIL OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES COMMITTEE
ON POLITICAL AND JURIDICAL AFFAIRS, COMPARATIVE STUDY: DATA
PROTECTION IN THE AMERICAS, OEA/Ser.G CP/CAJP-3063/12 (Apr. 3, 2012),
http://www.oas.org/es/sla/ddi/docs/CP-CAJP-3063-12_en.pdf [hereinafter COMP
ARATIVE STUDY] (addressing the Latin American State’s data protection regulati
ons individually).
7
Data Protection Definitions, UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD,
https://www.admin.ox.ac.uk/councilsec/compliance/dataprotection/definitions/
(last updated Nov. 28, 2013) (the person (or organization) who determines the
purposes for which and the manner in which any personal data are, or are to be,
processed (e.g. the University)).
8
Id. (“Data which relate to a living individual who can be identified from
that information, or from that and other information which is in the possession of
or is likely to come into the possession of, the data controller. It includes any
expression of opinion about the individual and any indication of the intentions of
the data controller or any other person in respect of the individual (subject to very
limited exceptions).).
9
Id. (“Information relating to race or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious beliefs, physical/mental health, trade union membership, sexual life or criminal activities. Special conditions apply to the processing of this type of information, including an obligation to obtain the explicit consent of the individual
(except in limited circumstances).”).
10
Id. (“Any living individual who is the subject of personal data (e.g. student,
applicant, member of staff, supervisor, referee etc).”).
11
See, e.g., CJEU, Joined cases C-92/09 and C-93/09, Volker and Markus
Schecke GbR and Hartmut Eifert v. Land Hessen, 9 November 2010, para. 48.
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Therefore, the right to data protection is subject to limitations, such
as national security.12
Data protection has become increasingly important because the
development of technology has led to prevalent data collecting and
processing in the public and private sectors.13 Countless government
entities report the recurrent collecting and tracking of individuals’
online movement.14 There is no indication of this trend slowing
down as businesses continue to increase demand for big data processing jobs.15
Global media sources repeatedly inform the public of the dangers associated with the processing of personal data. The dangers
surrounding inadequate data protection extend beyond voluntary
consumers to the majority of people using modern technology,
which tends to be conjoined with the participation in a modern society.16 Consumers that refuse to participate in the market because

12

Data Protection Definitions, supra note 8; e.g., (When “the processing is
necessary for the administration of justice; for the exercise of any functions conferred by or under enactment; for the exercise of any functions of the Crown, a
Minister of the Crown or a government department; for the exercise of any other
functions of a public nature exercised in the public interest.”); see also FRA,
HANDBOOK ON EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION LAW 2d Ed. 14 (2014), http://fra.
europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra-2014-handbook-data-protection-law-2nd-ed_
en.pdf.
13
See generally EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION SUPERVISOR, PRIVACY AND
COMPETITIVENESS IN THE AGE OF BIG DATA: THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN DATA
PROTECTION, COMPETITION LAW AND CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE DIGITAL
ECONOMY (Mar. 1, 2014), https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/sit
e/mySite/shared/Documents/Consultation/Opinions/2014/14-03-26_competitition_law_big_data_EN.pdf (illustrating how “online services are driving the huge
growth in the digital economy”).
14
Ginger Adams Otis, NSA can read emails, online chats and track Web
browsing habits without warrant, documents leaked by Edward Snowden show,
NEW YORK DAILY NEWS (Aug. 1, 2013, 12:05 AM), http://www.nydailynews.co
m/news/national/nsa-read-emails-warrent-docs-article-1.1413633.
15
Louis Columbus, Where Big Data Jobs Will Be in 2015, FORBES (Dec. 29,
2014, 3:23 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/louiscolumbus/2014/12/29/wherebig-data-jobs-will-be-in-2015/.
16
ABOUT THE DATA, https://www.aboutthedata.com/ (discussing companies
like Acxiom who collect and aggregate individuals’ information from surveys,
registrations, purchases, postings, public records, online searching, etc.).
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of these dangers constrain the success of the global economy.17 Although expert opinions vary on how far reaching the scope of data
protection should be and what, if any, regulatory role states should
play, there is a consensus that the topic of data protection—storage,
processing, and movement of personal information—will remain a
important issue in the future.18
In this age of social media, where people snap their every moment, the importance of data protection should be readily apparent.
However, people either do not know or do not care that their personal and sometimes sensitive data may, once collected, be: (1) sold
to private companies; (2) processed anywhere in the world; (3) accessed by a government agency without just cause; (4) stored for an
indefinite period of time; and (5) used for an unintended purpose.19
Consumers are often unaware that their personal data is in a database
because they are uninformed and many countries permit data controllers to take advantage of this ignorance by not having a comprehensive data protection law. For example, most email accounts,
which historically saved emails only to the consumers’ personal
hard drive, are now saved to a remote company server.20 As individuals’ data footprints have grown in size and technology has allowed
for more far reaching data procurement and storage, the risks associated with individuals’ personal data have increased.21
Entities in both the public and private sector regularly fail to provide adequate data security for the customers’ or employees’ per-

17

See discussion infra Section IV.
Michael Yang, Francis J. Gorman, What’s Yours Is Mine Protection And
Security In A Digital World, 36 MD. B.J. 24, 24-33 (2003).
19
See Kenneth M. Siegel, Protecting the Most Valuable Corporate Asset:
Electronic Data, Identity Theft, Personal Information, and the Role of Data Security in the Information Age, 111 PENN ST. L. REV. 779, 783-89 (2007).
20
Ilana R. Kattan, Cloudy Privacy Protections: Why the Stored Communications Act Fails to Protect the Privacy of Communications Stored in the Cloud, 13
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 617, 638-39 (2011).
21
LEE A. BYGRAVE, DATA PROTECTION LAW: APPROACHING ITS
RATIONALE, LOGIC, AND LIMITS 13 (2002).
18
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sonal data, which increases the likelihood of those individuals’ privacy being violated.22 According to a recent report, the world’s biggest tech companies are failing to comply with data privacy rights.23
Data abuses most commonly occur because the personal data is (1)
misused—leading to identity theft and fraud;24 (2) leaked—when an
entity inappropriately releases or voluntarily allows access to individual’s information that should be kept private; (3) unsecured—
when an entity that holds the information provides inadequate protection of the personal data.25 Once an individual’s personal data has
been leaked or left unsecure, his risk of future associated harm increases.26 The failure of adequate data protection mechanisms creates an environment where public and private entities may unjustifiably access, store, and distribute individuals’ personal data without
any consequence.
The majority of countries have established some form of data
protection structure, and certain international bodies have adopted a
regional data protection standard.27 National strategies include stringent European-based data protection laws, habeas data provisions,
and sector specific data regulatory structures.28
22

See generally Tsutomu Johnson, Sorry I Lost Your Files: Cybersecurity
Threats to Confidentiality, 28 UTAH B.J. 41, 41-43 (2015) (claiming that a hacker
looking to steal information [from a private corporation] will likely find the vault
unlocked); see also Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Hacking of Government Computers
Exposed 21.5 Million People, The New York Times (July 9, 2015), http://www.n
ytimes.com/2015/07/10/us/office-of-personnel-management-hackers-got-data-of
-millions.html?_r=0.
23
Sam Thielman, World’s biggest tech companies get failing grade on dataprivacy rights, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 3, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/nov/03/data-protection-failure-google-facebook-ranking-digitalrights.
24
Rob Waugh, Worldwide cost of identity theft could be $5 billion per year,
Microsoft survey finds, WeLiveSecurity (Feb. 12, 2014, 6:42 AM),
http://www.welivesecurity.com/2014/02/12/worldwide-cost-of-identity-theft-co
uld-be-5-billion-per-year-microsoft-survey-finds/.
25
ANUPAM CHANDER ET AL., SECURING PRIVACY IN THE INTERNET AGE 113
(2008).
26
Id. at 126.
27
DLA PIPER, supra note 5.
28
See generally Lee A. Bygrave, Privacy and Data Protection in an International Perspective, SCANDINAVIAN STUD. IN L. 165, 165-200 (2010), http://ww
w.uio.no/stuier/emner/jus/jus/JUR5630/v11/undervisningsmateriale/Privacy%20
and%20Data%20Protection%20in%20International%20Perspective.pdf.
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Data protection is comprised of a seemingly infinite number of
topics, but the scope of this Note is limited to the need and ability of
the IACtHR to advance a minimum data protection standard in the
Latin America. This Note does not seek to propose the specifics of
that minimum standard, nor does it evaluate the details of individual
states’ current domestic data protection laws. Specifically, Section
II addresses the historical development of data protection. Section
III discusses the data protection gap in Latin America. Section IV
examines the economic benefits surrounding a minimum data protection standard. Section V demonstrates the absence of any viable
alternatives. Section VI discusses the IACtHR’s jurisdiction. Section VII provides a rational basis for the Court advancing a minimum data protection standard. Section VIII proposes the role that
the IACtHR should play in the region.
SECTION II: THE HISTORICAL PROGRESSION OF DATA PROTECTION
Data protection legislation has drawn on the principles of “a person’s right of privacy, autonomy, integrity, and dignity.”29 Since the
first data protection laws, legislators have focused on protecting human rights, while attempting to avoid significantly stifling technological innovation and economic growth.30 Warren and Brandeis’
popular article, The Right to Privacy, was based on the idea
that ”[p]olitical, social, and economic changes entail the recognition
of new rights, and the common law, in its eternal youth, grows to
meet the demands of society.”31 Specifically, they asserted, under
the right to informational privacy, the “right to be let alone” was not
one of the “rights arising from contract or from special trust, but are
rights as against the world.”32 Judicial and legislative bodies have
continued to expand the scope of the right to privacy in the years

29

Id. at 167.
See id. at 180-86.
31
Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193, 193, 213 (1890); For more on the invention of the modern right to privacy, see generally Dorothy J. Glancy, The Invention of the Right to Privacy, 21
ARIZ. L. REV. 1 (1979).
32
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 31, at 193-213.
30
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since in an attempt to adapt to technological advances, like the Internet and credit cards.33 Institutions across the world now define a
person’s right to privacy or a person’s right to freedom of expression
to include his personal data, which may include text stored on paper
or bytes stored in the form of electronic memory.34
The international community initially discussed a right to privacy in the aftermath of World War II.35 In 1948, the United Nations
adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“Declaration”), thereby granting the right of privacy for the first time in modern history.36 Specifically, Article 12 of the Declaration states: “No
one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy,
family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and
reputation.”37 Although different methods of data protection currently exist across individual countries and regions throughout the
world, its roots are European.
A.

Europe
Europe has been a trailblazer in the way it has propelled data
protection laws globally and has maintained a regulatory framework
with the highest protective standards of any continent. In 1950, the
Council of Europe adopted the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“European Convention”).38 The European Convention emulated the Declaration, in
part, by providing a safeguard for privacy, but by also introducing
the protection of a person’s “private life.” Article 8 of the Convention declares, in relevant part, “[e]veryone has the right to respect
for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence”
and that a government shall not interfere with this right unless its
33
JONATHAN K. SOBEL ET AL., THE EVOLUTION OF DATA PROTECTION AS A
PRIVACY CONCERN, AND THE CONTRACT LAW DYNAMICS UNDERLYING IT 57
(2008).
34
See generally RAYMOND T. NIMMER, INFORMATIONAL LAW Ch. 8 (2003).
35
KEVIN M. KEENAN, INVASION OF PRIVACY: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 129
(2005).
36
G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10,
1948) [hereinafter U.N. Declaration].
37
Id. at art. 12.
38
Eur. Conv. on H.R. Conv. Rome, Conv. for the Protection of H.R. and Fundamental Freedoms (Nov. 4, 1950) [hereinafter European Convention on Human
Rights].
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conduct follows from the limited exceptions listed in the Convention.39
The Council of Europe created the European Court of Human
Rights (“ECtHR”) in 1959, which was tasked with enforcing the European Convention.40 The ECtHR began to define the scope of Article 8 protections through its early jurisprudence. Specifically, the
ECtHR considered whether States had violated Article 8 of the European Convention by interfering with individual petitioners’ right
to private life, without a legally justified basis that was necessary
and proportionate to that end.41 The ECtHR has since interpreted
Article 8 to include the protection of personal data.42 The Court held
that “the protection of personal data . . . is of fundamental importance to a person’s enjoyment of his or her right to respect for
private and family life as guaranteed by Article 8 of the [European]
Convention.”43 Although the ECtHR has broadly interpreted the
reach of Article 8, the Court has refrained from ruling that the processing of personal data, in and of itself, is a per se Article 8 trigger.44
In 1968, at the request of the Council of Europe, the Committee
of Human Rights (“Committee”) conducted a study on the “effectiveness of the protection offered under the [European Convention]
and by legislation of the member States to the right of privacy
against violations caused by the use of modern scientific and technological devices.”45 The Committee produced an interim report,

39

Id. at art. 8
U.N. Declaration, supra note 36.
41
Peter Hustinx, EU Data Protection Law: The Review of Directive 95/46
/EC and the Proposed General Data Protection Regulation 1, 3-4 (2015), https:/
/secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/E
DPS/Publications/Speeches/2014/14-09-15_Article_EUI_EN.pdf.
42
See e.g., Klass v. Germany, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1978); Malone v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1984); Leander v. Sweden, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1987); Gaskin v.
United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1989); Niemietz v. Germany, Eur. Ct. H.R.
(1992); Halford v. United Kingdom Eur. Ct. H.R. (1997); Amann v. Switzerland,
Eur. Ct. H.R. (2000); Rotaru v. Romania, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2000).
43
Z v. Finland, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 95 (1997), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=0
01-58033#{“itemid”:[“001-58033”]}.
44
Hustinx, supra note 41, at 7.
45
FRITS W. HONDIUS, EMERGING DATA PROTECTION IN EUROPE 65, 65
(1975).
40
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which concluded, in general, that the reach of the European Convention was still imprecise.46 Specifically, the report found that the
European Convention’s human right structure did not sufficiently
protect the right of privacy because it merely focused on the interferences by public authorities and failed to “extend to the relations
of private parties inter se.”47
In 1970, Hessen, Germany created a written regulation regarding data privacy through the domestic passage of the Bundesdatenschutzgesetz law, which became the world’s first data protection law.48 Germany subsequently passed a federal data protection law and a handful of European countries followed suit.49 The
individual States are said to have passed the progressive laws in response to the widespread discourse on data protection that began in
the United States a decade earlier.50 Over 45 years later, more than
fifty percent of the domestic data protection laws around the world
are from European countries.51
The Council of Europe, in an effort “to secure . . . for every individual . . . respect for his rights and fundamental freedoms, and in
particular his right to privacy, with regard to automatic processing
of personal data,” created the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data
(“Convention 108”).52 The Council of Europe opened Convention
108 for signature by the Council of Europe Member States in 1981
46

Id.
Id; see e.g., Marckx v. Belgium, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1979), http://hudoc.echr.c
oe.int/eng?i=001-57534 (showing that in addition to the primarily negative undertaking, there may be positive obligations inherent in an effective “respect” for
privacy enshrined in Article 8 of the European Convention).
48
Datenschutzgesetz, Oct. 7, 1970, HESSISCHES GESETZ-UND VEROR
DNUNGSBLATT I, [hereinafter German Data Protection Act].
49
Gesetz zum Missbrauch personenbezogener Daten bei der Datenverarbeitung [Act Concerning the Abuse of Data in Data Processing], Jan. 27, 1977,
BGBL I at 201.
50
Id; see also THOMAS HOEREN & SONJA EUSTERGERLING, PRIVACY AND
DATA PROTECTION AT THE WORKPLACE IN GERMANY 211-12 (2005).
51
Graham Greenleaf, Global Data Privacy Laws: 89 Countries, and Accelerating, 115 PRIVACY LAWS & BUS. INT’L. REP. (2012), http://ssrn.com/abstract=
2000034.
52
Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, Jan. 28, 1981 E.T.S. No. 108 [hereinafter Convention
108].
47
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and all of the States, with the exception of Turkey, have since signed
and ratified it.53 Convention 108, which was the first binding regional data protection law in the world, set benchmarks designed to
protect individuals from potential abuses that could arise with the
collection and processing of personal data.54 Convention 108 was
designed to regulate a variety of issues, such as the trans-border flow
of personal data.55 Simply put, Convention 108’s data protection restrictions have an extraterritorial dimension by prohibiting the export of data to countries that lack adequate data protection.56
By the 1990s, the Member States had passed individual domestic data protection laws within their respective States based on Convention 108’s principles.57 However, the European Union (“EU”)
quickly recognized that the variety of domestic data protection laws
created inconsistency between the States, which obstructed the free
flow of data and the functionality of the EU’s internal market.58
In 1995, the EU, in an effort to increase the congruence of the
States’ domestic data protection laws, built on the success of Convention 108 and adopted Directive 95/46/EC (“Directive”).59 The

53

Id.
FRA, HANDBOOK ON EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION LAW 2d Ed. 14
(2014), http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra-2014-handbook-data-protection
-law-2nd-ed_en.pdf.
55
Julia Fromholz, The European Union Data Privacy Directive, 15
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 461, 469 (2000).
56
See A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461,
1504-05 (2000) (explaining that a state must fulfill the Convention 108’s adequacy and enforcement criteria to process Europeans’ data).
57
See e.g., Loi No. 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978 relative à l’informatique, aux
fichiers et aux libertés [Law No. 78-17 of Jan. 6, 1978 concerning data processing,
records and freedom], Journal Officiel du 7 janvier et rectificatif au [J.O.] du 25
janvier [hereinafter French Law]; The Danish Private Registers Act, No. 293, June
8, 1978, amended by Act No. 383, June 10, 1987, translated in Danish Ministry
of Justice, Pub. No. 622 (Oct. 2, 1987) [hereinafter Danish Law]; Wet Persoonsregistraties [Act of Dec. 28, 1988, providing rules for the protection of privacy in connection with personal data files], Stb. 1988, at 665, translated in Council of Europe Doc. CJ-PD (89) 4 (Jan. 27, 1989), reprinted in A. Nugter, Transborder Flow of Personal Data Within the EC 397-410 (1990) [hereinafter Dutch
Law].
58
Id.
59
Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24
Oct. 1995 O.J. (L 281), 23/11/1995 P. 0031-0050, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/Lex54
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Directive required all Member States to pass domestic legislation
that complied with the specifics of the Directive.60 It has served as
one of the most important pieces of legislation on data protection.61
In short, the Directive specifies the general rules on data processing
and explains the protection that data subjects are entitled to.62 Moreover, the Directive prohibits an entity from possessing personal data
that is not transparent, held for a legitimate purpose, and proportionate to the legitimate purpose.63 Although the Directive has increased
data protection consistency among the Member States, the laws
across the region remain far from uniform. Some states, like France,
have gone above and beyond the minimum requirements outlined in
the Directive.64 Critics complain that the Directive’s failure to set a
ceiling for the data protection standards has led to states passing
overly onerous regulations, contrary to the Directive’s intent of establishing a harmonized data protection standard.65 The Directive
serves as evidence that the right to “protection of personal data” has
developed from its origins in informational privacy to a basic human
right in and of itself.66
The European data protection regulations have had a global influence. As discussed above, Europe implemented a protectionist
data protection structure, which requires a state to pass and enforce

UriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:en:HTML (protecting individual Europeans with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free
movement thereof).
60
Id.
61
Eve M. Brunts et. al., The International Clinical Trials Roadmap: Steering
Clear of Legal and Practical Roadblocks, 5 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 1, 49 (2012).
62
See generally Hustinx, supra note 41.
63
Id.
64
French Law, supra note 57, at art. 1, see e.g., France’s relevant domestic
law, which may be the broadest data protection law of any of the Member States.
The domestic law states “Information technology should be at the service of every
citizen. Its development shall take place in the context of international cooperation. It shall not violate human identity, human rights, privacy, or individual or
public liberties.”
65
Tracie B. Loring, An Analysis of the Informational Privacy Protection Afforded by the European Union and the United States, 37 TEX. INT’L L.J. 421, 42425 (2002).
66
González Fuster, The Emergence of Personal Data Protection as a Fundamental Right of the EU (2014); Convention 108, supra note 51, at art. 8.
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a domestic data protection law that is adequate by European standards.67 Non-member states around the world have performed the accession requirements, pursuant to Article 23 of Convention 108, in
an attempt to gain access to the estimated 500 million consumers
across Europe.68
B.

Asia
The Asia-Pacific region’s data protection strategy is based on an
economic incentive. In 2004, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (“APEC”) 21 Member States, which account for a third of the
world’s population and half of the global Gross Domestic Production, adopted the APEC Privacy Framework (“Framework”).69 The
Framework includes a number of popular privacy principles found
in other domestic and regional data protection legislation.70 For example, the Framework recommends the regulation of the collection,
quality, security, use, access to, and correction of personal information.71 However, critics have pointed to the voluntary nature of
the agreement and the inexistence of enforcement measures, which
make it superficial in nature.72 Similarly, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (“ASEAN”) has committed to publish a best
practices data protection manual in an effort to create further harmonization between the Member States’ economies in the face of
globalization.73 Both organizations are attempting to set up uniform

67

Convention 108, supra note 51, at art. 23 (requiring that a petitioning state
be found to have adequate domestic data protection regulations and effective enforcement mechanisms).
68
Paul M. Schwartz, European Data Protection Law and Restrictions on International Data Flows, 80 IOWA L. REV. 471, 484 (1995).
69
Graham Greenleaf, Five years of the APEC Privacy Framework: Failure
or promise?, 25 COMP. L. & SECURITY REV. 28, 28 (2009).
70
See generally id.
71
See generally APEC SECRETARIAT, APEC PRIVACY FRAMEWORK, (2005),
http://www.apec.org/Groups/Committee-on-Trade-and-Investment/~/media/File
s/Groups/ECSG/05_ecsg_privacyframewk.ashx.
72
See generally APEC GROUP ON SERVICES, MENU OF OPTIONS FOR
VOLUNTARY LIBERALIZATION, FACILITATION, AND PROMOTION OF ECONOMIC
AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION IN SERVICES TRADE AND INVESTMENT (Aug. 15,
2003), http://www.apec.org/~/media/Files/Groups/GOS/03_cti_gos_moo.pdf.
73
EDWIN LEE YONG CIEH, BEYOND DATA PROTECTION: STRATEGIC CASE
STUDIES AND PRACTICAL GUIDANCE—PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION AND
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rules to encourage and stabilize e-commerce growth. However, neither the APEC nor ASEAN have established any legitimate
measures to keep their respective nations accountable for passing or
enforcing domestic data protection laws.
C.

The United States
The United States (U.S.) has resisted the global trend toward
comprehensive data protection.74 Some domestic data protection
bills have been proposed, but none have garnered the requisite legislative support to become law.75 Instead, the U.S. data-protection
scheme uses a sectoral76 model that relies on the self-regulation of
industries and individual businesses.77 The U.S. data protection
structure has created problems domestically and internationally.
The fragmented U.S. data protection structure fails to protect its
citizens’ personal information.78 Simply put, data subjects’ breach
of privacy claims are repeatedly dismissed because the claims fail
to violate the limited industry-specific sectoral laws. For example, a
U.S. District Judge dismissed a class action lawsuit against Facebook for “secretly tracking the Internet activity of its users after they
log off” because the Court found that subscribers didn’t specify how
they were harmed or what law Facebook had violated.79 Data controllers in the U.S. make a practice of privately storing a mass

PRIVACY LAW IN MALAYSIA 14 (Noriswadi Ismail, Edwin Lee Yong Cieh, eds.,
2012).
74
See generally Ryan Moshell, . . . and Then There Was One: The Outlook
for A Self-Regulatory United States Amidst A Global Trend Toward Comprehensive Data Protection, 37 TEX. TECH L. REV. 357 (2005).
75
Id. at 367 (Describing the self-regulatory model as “companies and industry bodies establish[ing] governance through codes and self-policing.”).
76
Id. (Describing the sectoral model as involving “no general laws; rather, it
only targets those specific industries shown to be a threat to data privacy.”).
77
Anna E. Shimanek, Do You Want Milk With Those Cookies?: Complying
With the Safe Harbor Privacy Principles, 26 J. CORP. L. 455, 472 (2001).
78
Moshell, supra note 74, at 373.
79
Joel Rosenblatt and Robert Burnson, Facebook Wins Dismissal of $15 Billion Users’ Privacy Suit, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (Oct. 24, 2015, 2:35 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-10-24/facebook-wins-dismissalof-15-billion-users-privacy-suit; but see, In re Linked In User Privacy Litig., 932
F. Supp. 2d 1089 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (explaining that the plaintiffs survived Linked
In’s motion to dismiss for lack of standing after the plaintiffs argued that they
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amount of individuals’ personal or sensitive data because the state’s
sectoral approach is too limited in scope to provide victims a cause
of action and the U.S. Constitution lacks a provision that grants an
explicit right to privacy generally.80
The U.S. data protection structure is becoming an obstacle for
U.S. corporations conducting business with countries whose data
protection laws regulate the transborder processing of data. In 2000,
the EU approved the “safe harbor” framework, which allowed “certified multinationals to pass data between the EU and the United
States without interruption or the risk of prosecution under European data protection laws.”81 However, the European Court of Justice’s ruling in Schrems v. Data Protection Authority invalidated the
US-EU Safe Harbor agreement.82 The ruling nullified the safe harbor agreement, which more than 5,000 U.S. companies rely on to
handle European customers’ personal data.83 EU privacy regulators
have set a grace period through January 2016, at which time the EU
and US authorities will try to negotiate a more protective agreement.84
D.

Latin America
With the exception of the limited habeas data provisions, Latin
America States had not adopted any data protection regulations until
1999.85 The American Convention was adopted in 1969 at the InterAmerican Specialized Conference on Human Rights in San José,
relied on company’s promise of surety when they paid for premium memberships).
80
Jonathan P. Cody, Protecting Privacy Over the Internet: Has the Time
Come to Abandon Self-Regulation?, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 1183, 1193 (1999).
81
Annette M. Schüller, et al., Doing Business in the European Union: An
Overview of Common Legal Issues, COLO. LAW REV. 9, 19 (2002); see also Amy
P. Monahan, Deconstructing Information Walls: The Impact of the European
Data Directive on U.S. Businesses, 29 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 275, 288 (1998).
82
Kelli Clark, The EU Safe Harbor Agreement Is Dead, Here’s What To Do
About It, FORBES BUSINESS (Oct. 27, 2015, 3:30 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sit
es/riskmap/2015/10/27/the-eu-safe-harbor-agreement-is-dead-heres-what-to-doabout-it/#62c3674d7171.
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
Greenleaf, supra note 56, at 9 (stating that Chile first passed a domestic
data protection law in 1999).
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Costa Rica.86 A decade later, the Organization of American States
(“OAS”)87 established the IACtHR, which was created to enforce
and interpret the American Convention.88 The Inter-American Commission of Human Rights (“IACHR”), which acts as an intermediary between the alleged victims and the Member States, was
founded the same year to supplement the IACtHR with the human
rights protection branch of the OAS.89
The IACtHR is structurally comparable to the ECtHR with both
operating as the regional human right courts of their respective regions. However, the two entities have played different roles in interpreting and enforcing their respective human right conventions.90 In
the more than 35 years since its assembly, the IACtHR has produced
a relatively limited and restricted jurisprudence. This is, in part, because the American Convention was adopted at a time when the region was plagued by political instability, violence, and economic
turmoil.91 Therefore, petitioners alleging Member State violations
of first generation human rights have filled the IACtHR’s docket.
For example, Mexico, one of the more politically and economically
stable countries in the region, is currently being investigated by the
IACHR for the forced disappearance of 43 Ayotzinapa students that
went missing last year.92 Additionally, the IACtHR has rendered
86

See Organization of American States, American Convention on Human
Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter American Convention].
87
The OAS is a regional organization open to states across the Americas. The
OAS has 35 Member States. See Charter of the Organization of American States,
Apr. 30, 1948, 119 U.N.T.S. 3, as amended by Protocol of Amendment to the
Charter of the Organization of American States (“Protocol of Buenos Aires), Feb.
27, 1967, 721 U.N.T.S. 324, as amended by Protocol of Amendment to the Charter of the Organization of American States (“Protocol of Cartagena de Indias”),
Dec. 5, 1985, 25 I.L.M. 529 (1986) [hereinafter OAS Charter].
88
INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, I/A COURT HISTORY (2015),
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/index.php/en/about-us/historia-de-la-corteidh.
89
Charter of the Organization of American States (1948) (as amended by the
Protocol of Buenos Aires 1967, Protocol of Cartagena de Indias 1985, Protocol of
Washington 1992, Protocol of Managua 1993) ch. XV, art. 106.
90
See generally SCOTT DAVIDSON, INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS
SYSTEM 259, 259 (1997).
91
Id. at 259.
92
Joshua Partlow, Mexico’s account of how 43 students disappeared is
wrong, THE WASHINGTON POST (Sept. 6, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.co
m/world/the_americas/mexicos-account-of-how-43-students-disappeared-is-
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less than a quarter of the judgments of its European counterpart, in
part, because the IACtHR has the smallest budget of any international court and has limited personnel.93 Accordingly, the IACtHR
has produced relatively limited legal analysis regarding the Convention’s individual Articles because the Court has focused on the
“questions of fact and proof of fact” regarding the human right violations, instead of analyzing the scope of the Convention’s standards
and its interpretation in the face of technological developments.94
The IACtHR has not sufficiently developed the scope of the
American Convention to incorporate the concept of data protection.
Article 11—right to privacy of the American Convention, mirrors
Article 8—right to privacy of the European Convention.95 The plain
language written in the text of Article 11 stipulates the same protections, such as the right to private life, which are listed in Article 8 of
the European Convention. Furthermore, Article 11 extends even further than Article 8 to include the protection against “unlawful attacks on [an individual’s] honor or reputation.”96
The IACtHR’s jurisprudence addressing Article 11 right to privacy is more developed than the majority of the Convention’s other
human rights because of the volume of cases that the Court has heard
on the subject.97 Even so, the Court’s past decisions on the right to
privacy focus, like the early decision of the ECtHR, on preventing
violations of physical intrusions of privacy.98 The IACtHR has only

wrong-new-report-says/2015/09/06/26a4a7be-5443-11e5-b225-90edbd49f362_
story.html.
93
Diego García-Sayán, The Role of the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights in the Americas, 19 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 103, 105 (2012).
94
Davidson, supra note 90, at 260.
95
American Convention, supra note 86, at arts. 8 & 11.
96
Id. at art. 11 (stating “(1) Everyone has the right to have his honor respected
and his dignity recognized. (2) No one may be the object of arbitrary or abusive
interference with his private life, his family, his home, or his correspondence, or
of unlawful attacks on his honor or reputation. (3) Everyone has the right to the
protection of the law against such interference or attacks.”).
97
See e.g., García Asto and Ramírez Rojas v. Peru, IA Ct. H.R. (2005);
Gomes Lund et al. v. Brazil, IA Ct. H.R. (2010); Kimel v. Argentina, IA Ct. H.R.
(2008); Moiwana Community v. Suriname, IA Ct. H.R. (2005).
98
See LEE A. BYGRAVE, DATA PROTECTION LAW: APPROACHING ITS
RATIONALE, LOGIC AND LIMITS Ch. 7. (2002).

206

INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:3

addressed informational privacy in a limited capacity, which limited
relation to data protection.99
Many Latin American countries have protected, in a limited capacity, personal information with the advent of the concept of habeas data, which, “derives from due-process doctrine based on the
writ of habeas corpus.”100 Specifically, habeas data translates from
Latin to the idea “that you [the data subject] have the data,” and
hinges on one’s right to control the information stored and revealed
about him. 101 The right of habeas data was first established in Brazil’s 1988 Constitution,102 and the right can now be found in some
form in the majority of Latin American countries’ constitutions.103
The inclusion of habeas data protections across the region coincided
with the passage of new or reformed constitutions, in the 1980s and
1990s, which was the same time when data protection was popularized through Convention 108 and Directive 95/46/EC in Europe.104
While some Latin American countries still rely solely on a habeas data clause to protect personal data, other States have been
more active in an effort to better regulate personal data. In recent
years, some Latin American states have followed the European ap-

99

See e.g., Escher et al. v. Brazil, IA Ct. H.R. (2009) (holding that the state
violated Article 11 when it applied unjustified wire-tapping as well as when it
conducted warrantless searches of a petitioner’s home).
100
Lee A. Bygrave, Privacy and Data Protection in an International Perspective, STOCKHOLM INSTITUTE FOR SCANDINAVIAN LAW 166, 169, (2010), http://w
ww.uio.no/studier/emner/jus/jus/JUR5630/v11/undervisningsmateriale/Privacy
%20and%20Data%20Protection%20in%20International%20Perspective.pdf.
101
See Andres Guadamuz, Habeas Data: The Latin American Response to
Data Protection, 2 THE JOURNAL OF INFORMATION, LAW AND TECHNOLOGY
(2000), www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/jilt/2000_2/guadamuz.
102
Keith S. Rosenn, Procedural Protection of Constitutional Rights in Brazil,
59 AM. J. COMP. L. 1009, 1021 (2011).
103
White & Case, From Habeas Data Action to Omnibus Data Protection:
The Latin American Privacy Revolution, 19 no. 9 LAT. AM. L. & BUS. REP. (2011),
http://www.whitecase.com/publications/article/habeas-data-action-omnibusdata-protection-latin-american-privacy-revolution (listing Latin American countries with the right of habeas data as including Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Honduras, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Dominican
Republic, Uruguay and Venezuela).
104
See e.g., id. (listing Brazil, Colombia, Paraguay, Bolivia, Ecuador, and
Venezuela).
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proach by passing domestic legislation that parallels the data protection principles introduced by the relevant EU directives.105 Argentina and Uruguay have gone so far as to petition the EU to evaluate
their domestic laws as a requisite element for succession to Convention 108.106 Other countries in the region, such as Mexico and Colombia, have passed data protection laws that would arguably meet
the accession standard.107 The majority of Latin America countries
have participated in the ever-rapid global trend toward data protection regulation.108 However, less than half of the members of the
OAS have implemented a comprehensive data protection law.109
Specifically, many of the region’s domestic data protection laws
only apply to the public or private sectors individually, and others
have data protection laws, but fail to establish a Data Protection Authority (“DPA”) to enforce it.110
The IACHR’s conduct over the last fifteen years has been instrumental in creating an atmosphere where the states in the region have
already been informed on issues surrounding data protection. The
Inter-American Commission dealt with the issue of habeas data indirectly through its establishment of the OAS Office of the Special
Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression (“Special Rapporteur”) in
1998.111 The Special Rapporteur operates within the juridical framework of the IACHR and is tasked with increasing awareness and
observance of the freedom of expression across the Americas.112
The IACHR, in reference to a report published by the Special Rapporteur, describes a habeas data action as “the right of any individual to have access to information referring to him and to modify,
105

Tobón, supra note 5, at 6.
American Convention, supra note 86, at art. 23.
107
Tobón, supra note 5, at 6.
108
See generally DLA PIPER, supra note 5.
109
Id.
110
See generally Graham Greenleaf, The influence of European data privacy
standards outside Europe: implications for globalization of Convention 108 2
INT’L DATA PRIVACY L., 68 (2012).
111
ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/expression/showarticle.asp?artID=132.
112
Santiago A. Canton, The Role of the OAS Special Rapporteur for Freedom
of Expression in Promoting Democracy in the Americas, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV.
307, 309 (2002); Claudio Grossman, Freedom of Expression in the Inter-American System for the Protection of Human Rights, 7 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 411,
419 (2001).
106
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remove, or correct such information, when necessary.”113 The Commission continues by supporting the Special Rapporteur’s conclusion that a habeas data action is based on three premises:
1) the right of any individual to not have his privacy
disturbed; 2) the right of any individual to access information referring to him in public or private databases, and to modify, remove, or correct information
if it is sensitive, false, biased, or discriminatory; and
3) and the right of any individual to use the action of
habeas data as an oversight mechanism.114
Furthermore, the IACHR has written guidelines advising states
across the region not to arbitrarily interfere with its citizens’ personal data and to prohibit other private actors from the same abusive
conduct.115 In its 2013 report, the Special Rapporteur called for individual legislatures to respect international human rights obligations pursuant to the Internet and privacy.116 Although the IACtHR
has not addressed the protection of a person’s data through its case
law, it has permitted habeas data actions. Petitioners have brought
“the action of habeas data remedy” to investigate past human right
violations by past or current governments in an attempt to discover
information, such as the final resting place of relatives that had disappeared by past governmental regimes.117
SECTION III. LATIN AMERICAN HAS A DATA PROTECTION GAP
The IACtHR should enforce a minimum data protection standard across the region. It must take action because a number of countries in the region have failed to pass comprehensive data protection

113

IACHR, REPORT ON THE SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS IN THE
AMERICAS, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.124, ¶ 87 (2006), available at http://www.cidh.org
/countryrep/Defenders/defenderstoc.htm.
114
Id. at ¶ 89.
115
See id; see also Canton, supra note 112, at 312-13.
116
See Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for
Freedom of Expression 477-530 (2013).
117
Brian Farrell, The Right to Habeas Corpus in the Inter-American Human
Rights System, 33 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 197, 199 (2010).
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laws and some of the countries that have data protection laws fail to
enforce them adequately.
A. Not All Latin American States Have Adequate Data Protection
Regulations
While a number of Latin American countries, such as Bolivia,
Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, and Venezuela, have failed to pass
comprehensive data protection laws,118 most Latin American countries afford their citizens the right of privacy in some form.119 However, this conventional standard of privacy varies greatly from state
to state because individual governments have interpreted the meaning of privacy in different historical and cultural contexts.120 The
antiquated privacy provisions fail to consider the modern issue of
data protection, and both habeas data provisions and sector specific
laws are too limited in scope to adequately protect individuals’ personal data.121
1.Habeas Data
The majority of OAS States have a constitutional habeas data
provision.122 However, the right of habeas data, while progressive
in the region when first introduced, falls short of providing sufficient
personal data protection in the face of advancing technology.123 For
example, when a state relies solely on a habeas data construction to
protect personal data, the system often does not (1) include a DPA;
(2) address the topic of data transfers or sensitive data; (3) require
database security measures; and (4) control the purpose or time personal information is stored.124 Additionally, the habeas data remedy
only applies after the damage has been done. Therefore, a habeas
data provision serves only as a minimal protection of individual’s
118

Tobón, supra note 5, at 6.
COMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 6, at 7.
120
See id.
121
See id. at 8.
122
See id; e.g., PARAGUAY [CONSTITUTION] 1992, art. 135, an English translation is available at http:// www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/pa00000_.html; PERU
[CONSTITUTION] 1993, art. 200, § 3, an English translation is available at http:/
/www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/pa00000_. html.
123
Maxim Gakh, Argentina’s Protection of Personal Data: Initiation and Response, 2 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 781, 784 (2006).
124
Id.
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privacy and is immaterial in combating the violation of an individual’s privacy through an abuse of his data privacy.
Argentina, as well as other Latin American countries, passed
comprehensive personal data protection laws during the last two
decades because of the limited protections habeas data provisions
provide to their respective citizens.125 It is unclear whether the recent data protection laws were passed in an effort to comply with
the European system or if the legislative action was motivated by
human rights. As more states adopt domestic data protection laws,
the international community should pay particular attention to the
states’ self-regulation enforcement mechanisms.
2. Industry Specific Data Regulations
There are no industry specific laws in Latin America that adequately protect personal data. For example, elements of consumer
protection laws overlap with data protection laws, but the consumer
protection laws are too limited in scope to fulfill the data protection
laws’ purpose.126 First, a consumer protection law, as denoted by its
name, does not protect non-consumers. For example, it does not protect against a company’s mismanagement of employee personal information nor does it regulate mega data stored by government entities. A consumer protection law may be used in a case of identity
theft, but the consumer protection regulations do not provide a consumer with a claim against a company that stores his information in
a database that makes him more susceptible to identity theft. Any
state that was to expand the scope of its consumer protection law
would not resolve the current state-to-state standard that lacks harmonization.127

125

See id. at 787; see generally DLA PIPER, supra note 5 (explaining the comprehensive data protection laws passed by Mexico, Peru and Costa Rica and other
Latin American countries).
126
See Robert G. Vaughn, Consumer Protection Laws in South America, 17
HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 275, 278 (1994).
127
Robert Kossick, The Internet in Latin America: New Opportunities, Developments, & Challenges, 16 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1309, 1338 (2001).
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B. Latin American States Have a Reputation of Failing to Enforce
Domestic Data Protection Laws
The IACtHR should establish a minimum data protection standard in order to minimize the damage a victim would face if a State
fails to enforce a violation of its domestic data protection regulations. The overlapping jurisdiction would provide victims with a
second line of defense by an independent forum, which would allow
victims to seek redress for violations that the State fails to enforce.
Many countries in Latin America, whether warranted or not,
have a poor reputation of applying domestic laws indiscriminately
throughout society or enforcing the laws at all.128 Whether referring
to the divide between “legal theory and judicial administration”129
or analyzing the issue in terms of the symbolic verses operative
value of the law,130 the rift between the laws on the books and the
states’ enforcement of those laws has been well documented
throughout the region’s history.131
It is relevant to question how resilient Latin American governments will be in enforcing their newly adopted data protection laws.
It is particularly appropriate to question a state like Chile, which

128
See Keith S. Rosenn, Brazil’s Legal Culture: The Jeito Revisited, 1 FLA.
INT’L L.J. 1, 2-5 (1984) (illustrating the gap between law and society, as evidenced
by the jeito, a Brazilian way of “coping with the formal legal system” by bending
or bypassing law in widely established and culturally acceptable ways).
129
Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12, 1518 (1910).
130
Rogério Pires da Silva, Protection of Personal Data in Brazil and the Provisions of Brazil’s New Internet Law, 44 no. 2 ABA INT’L LAW NEWS 9, 10 (2015)
(addressing the limited impact of Brazil’s new Internet law in light of the black
market trading of individual’s personal data by corporations and government
members alike).
131
KENNETH L. KARST & KEITH S. ROSENN, LAW AND DEVELOPMENT IN
LATIN AMERICA: A CASE BOOK 58 (1975) (arguing that disparity regarding the
application of the domestic laws is rooted in various “historical and cultural factors” such as “idealism, paternalism, legalism, formalism, and lack of penetration.”); see also John Linarelli, Anglo-American Jurisprudence and Latin America, 20 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 50, 54-60 (1996) (describing the conflict between
the rules that govern the informal sector and the official legal system in Latin
America, especially the fact that the formal system that serves elite interests leading most Latin Americans to ignore it).
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passed a data protection law, but has failed to establish a Data Protection Act (“DPA”) to enforce the standards set out in the law.132
While individuals may be able to bring a domestic cause of action
in certain instances, it serves little practical function without a DPA
regulating the enforcement of the law. Specifically, individuals are
often unaware when their information is being used or stored by a
corporation, especially when the data is moving between companies
and over domestic borders.133 Moreover, the limited burden a consumer’s individual suit would cause a large corporation or government entity is unlikely to deter the prohibited conduct and the potential damages would not justify a victim’s litigation costs.
There are two prevalent arguments that require further analysis.
First, some argue that the notion of Latin America having an enforcement issue is outdated.134 This theory is based on the idea that
Latin American countries have taken action to address the gap between state law and social practice.135 Specifically, states are said to
have employed legal reforms, increased legal education, and improved the examination of values and actors within the informal sector in order to develop strategies to increase the enforcement of all
laws.136 While it is undisputed that a number of Latin American
countries have improved the enforcement of their respective data
protection laws over the last few decades, there remains a discernable enforcement gap in a number of Latin American countries.137
Most Latin American countries have entered into an intellectual
property treaty or a free trade agreement that include intellectual
property protections. However, a number of those countries have not
been diligent in enforcing those agreements because intellectual
property is a modern right that those countries do not have a tradition
of protecting.138 For example, Mexico has passed a number of copyright laws dating back to 1997; however it continues to do a poor
132

Greenleaf, supra note 110, at 70.
EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION SUPERVISOR, supra note 12, at 35.
134
Jorge L. Esquirol, Continuing Fictions of Latin American Law, 55 FLA. L.
REV. 41, 53-59 (2003).
135
Id. at 54.
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Id.
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Id. at 56.
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David Switzer & Danny G. Pérez y Soto, The State of Intellectual Property
in Latin America: Legal Trends, Economic Development and Trade, B&R LATIN
AMERICA IP 1, 14 (2012).
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job of enforcing the laws.139 Although the purpose of the Mexican
Federal Law on Copyright is to protect intellectual property in all
forms, the state has failed to consistently enforce these provisions in
practice.140 The Mexican markets are saturated with unlicensed
knockoff products, and 25% of pharmaceutical products sold in
Mexico are counterfeit.141 Even if the Mexican government intends
to enforce these laws, issues of enforcement still arise in cases where
the government makes a good-faith effort due to inadequate training
and resources for the enforcement of the law and corruption in the
administrative and judicial arenas.142 Claims that the issue of enforcement is no longer a peril of Latin American states legal systems
fail to disprove the overwhelming evidence to the contrary.143 Latin
American countries may fail to enforce the modern privacy protection laws since the laws relate to a modern right and those countries
have a weak track record of enforcing laws relating to modern rights.
Second, academics claim that the enforcement critique is misleading because it fails to consider that “the gap between law and
action is axiomatically ever present [and while it is true that] some
rules [are] more closely followed than others, a full society-wide
measure is quite impossible, and fair comparisons are elusive.”144
This argument is not flawed, but the line of reasoning reinforces the
argument for spreading the burden of enforcement to the IACtHR.
The lack of a statistical analysis regarding the specific enforcement
deficiencies based on individual states and their respective laws
139

See generally Mexico Federal Law on Copyright, Mar. 24, 1997, http://w
ww.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=128791 (An English translation of Mexico’s Ley Federal del Derecho de Autor).
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Next and Why?, 7 SW. J. L. & TRADE AM. 1, 48-50 (2000) (discussing the status
of IP law in Latin America).
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29 AM. J.L. & MED. 525, 530 (2003).
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See McClintock, supra note 140, at 94.
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does not disprove the enforcement gap, but merely introduces the
need for states to pay more attention to documenting and solving
their enforcement failings. Whether or not it is reasonable to expect
a state to completely eradicate the enforcement gap does not change
a state’s obligations under the American Convention.
The progress that some Latin American states have made in the
area of enforcing legislation is commendable, but the majority of
countries in the region will need to do more to reverse the longstanding belief that Latin America states fail to adequately enforce their
respective laws. A victim is unlikely to bring a claim when he believes that the state will not fulfills its obligation to enforce the
law.145
SECTION IV: A MINIMUM DATA PROTECTION STANDARD WOULD
BENEFIT THE ECONOMY
A minimum data protection standard applied across Latin America would benefit both individual Latin American countries’ and the
global economy. Conversely, the region’s failure to establish a harmonized data protection standard has resulted in a decreased economic viability as other regions continue to develop and modernize.
A universal adoption of a minimum data protection standard
would, pursuant to the principle of free trade and the direct boost the
European relations would have on Latin America, create a more
conducive environment for international companies interested in
conducting business in Latin America. Issues surrounding data protection have become a central consideration for corporations’ compliance and risk management departments.146 Some transnational
businesses are concerned with the patchwork of data protection laws
throughout Latin America because it causes uncertainty regarding

145

See e.g., Mariana Hernández Crespo, A Systemic Perspective of ADR in
Latin America: Enhancing the Shadow of the Law Through Citizen Participation,
10 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 91, 92-97 (2008) (arguing that, although Latin
American law purports to protect citizens, neither courts nor alternative dispute
resolution enforce these laws effectively, and concluding that participatory lawmaking is essential to strengthening dispute resolution systems in Latin America).
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Raphaël Gellert, Understanding Data Protection As Risk Regulation, 18 J.
INTERNET L. 3 (2015).
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the law controlling the outsourced data.147 Furthermore, a conscientious corporation may bear added legal costs aimed at avoiding state
imposed civil and criminal penalties.148 Accordingly, the failure to
establish a coordinated data protection legal infrastructure serves as
an obstacle to cross-border trade and investment.149
International organizations have illustrated the economic principles that support the adoption of widespread data protection laws.
APEC has invested substantial time and resources in an attempt to
create a harmonized data protection system among its Member
States in support of its mantra of providing a “forum for facilitating
economic growth, cooperation, trade, and investment in the AsiaPacific region.”150 Additionally, the World Trade Organization
(WTO) promotes the free trade among nations in an effort to foster
increased global economic output of more efficient, economic, and
innovative products.151 A minimum data protection standard in
Latin American would serve to further open the Latin American
market consistent with the economic goals of the WTO. Therefore,
a widely accepted data protection standard in Latin America would
help create a stable environment for economic opportunities and
growth.
However, corporations in states that have not passed comprehensive data protection laws may advocate for a free market approach instead of a government-regulated system. Specifically,
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Catherine L. Mann, Balancing Issues and Overlapping Jurisdictions in the
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GALEXIA (Oct. 2008), http://www.galexia.com/public/research/articles/research_
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Nov. 18, 2015).
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hatis_e/what_stand_for_e.htm (last visited Nov. 18, 2015) (comprised of 159
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businesses may complain of increased costs of compliance, transaction, operating, and opportunity costs of conforming to a data protection regulatory scheme. Economic principles may even indicate
that these costs are likely to be passed along to consumers.152
Nevertheless, the direct increase in European business investment alone would likely outweigh any negligible costs passed on to
consumers. Experts project that more adequate data protection laws
across Latin America may translate to more business flowing from
Europe to those countries.153 For example, European countries keep
their call centers and data centers within Europe due to the stringent
cross-border regulations of personal data.154 However, the passage
of adequate laws in another region like Latin America, with lower
wages and operating costs, would appeal to those private and public
entities that would see gains from outsourcing data related jobs. Colombia recently passed a comprehensive data protection law replicating the European adequacy requirements.155 The law was designed especially to pass the adequacy standard required by Convention 108 and is expected to improve the country’s economic potential.156 Latin American countries would not only profit directly
from European and other international investors, but would also
benefit from the technological updates that would likely follow the
adoption of data protection laws across Latin America.
A country’s update to modern technological products produces
improved productivity and efficiency nationally, which stimulates
economic growth and may lead to an improved standard of living
for the countries’ respective citizens.157 For example, products like
152

Gregory Shaffer, Globalization and Social Protection: The Impact of EU
and International Rules in the Ratcheting Up of U.S. Privacy Standards, 25 YALE
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.nearshoreamericas.com/ales-strengthening-latin-americas-exportation-globalservices/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2015).
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NEW YORK TIMES (Apr. 19, 2007).
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Gaona, supra note 153.
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the cloud services are advertised to provide consumers with reduced
capital costs, improved flexibility, streamline processes, and improved accessibility.158 Specifically, the global market for cloud services is projected to amass more than $241 billion by 2020.159 Internet-based companies, like MercadoLibre160 and Facebook, have experienced widespread success across the region with the increased
use of modern technology in Latin America over the last decade.161
Two out of three Latin Americans are now online, and they represent
potential consumers and innovators, owners, and employees of techbased companies. However, widespread use of modern tech products requires consumer confidence.162 In short, a harmonized data
protection standard would likely increase economic growth across
the region by increasing opportunities in the multi-billion-dollar
tech industry and increasing consumer confidence in new technological products.163
While the scope and length of this article discourages any further
discussion of economics, future work may consider the choice that
Latin American legislatures may face regarding the dilemma of
whether to pass more strict and expansive data protection legislation
in an attempt to entice investment from European corporations, or
to either not pass a data protection law or to pass a narrow law to
encourage U.S. investment.164 If the IACtHR fails to create minimum data protections, the limited U.S. companies could conceivably entice Latin American countries to remove data protection laws
or limit the scope of the laws, in essence creating a race to the least
restrictive data protection regulations.
cloud, such as job creation, cost savings, democratization of computing and social
inclusion, increased agility, and security).
158
Id. at 39-45.
159
Paul M. Schwartz, Information Privacy in the Cloud, 161 U. PA. L. REV.
1623, 1627 (2013) (predicting that the global market for cloud services will amass
$241 billion by 2020).
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MercadoLibre is the largest e-commerce ecosystem in Latin America, see
Overview, MERCADOLIBRE, http://investor.mercadolibre.com/.
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SECTION V: THERE ARE NO VIABLE ALTERNATIVES
The use of the IACtHR is the best forum to immediately implement a minimum data protection standard across Latin America. The
IACtHR is the only forum that enjoys contentious jurisdiction over
the majority of Latin American states and wields substantial influence, even if only through political pressure, across the region as a
whole.165 The influence of the IACtHR extends past the 20 States
currently subject to the IACtHR’s jurisdiction to the other 15 OAS
Member States.166 While some alternatives may seem viable upon
first glance, systematic flaws surface upon further review. There are
two alternatives that justify a brief analysis.
First, some encourage a wait-and-see approach because the European influence throughout Latin America has already proved important in motivating domestic data protection regulations and will
likely continue.167 Furthermore, five Latin American countries—
Argentina, Uruguay, Mexico, Peru and Costa Rica—have already
passed comprehensive data protection laws modeled after the EU
system.168 These countries account for an estimated 185 million people, which is a third of the total population of the region.169 However, the purpose of the IACtHR is to require all states, not a mere
majority of states, to comply with the human rights listed in the
American Convention.
While the European data protection system may be the gold
standard for governments looking to pass data protection legislation,
not all Latin American countries have shown an interest in passing
a European-style data protection law.170 The potential gains associated with passing adequate data protection laws pursuant to the European standard, such as open data channels with Europe, have not
been enough to motivate those Latin American countries that have
165
See Inter-American Human Rights System, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE
RESOURCE CENTER, http://www.ijrcenter.org/regional/inter-american-system/
(last visited Nov. 18, 2015).
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American Convention on Human Rights “Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica”
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2015).
167
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yet to pass data protection laws.171 Under the current structure, each
of those Latin American countries has the autonomy to choose not
to adopt a data protection law. There is reason to believe that some
of these countries will not voluntarily adopt a data protection standard because of the protectionist economic policies engrained in a
region’s history.172 Extensive harmonization of the European data
protection standard, or any external standard, is extremely unlikely
to occur in the near future, in part, because of the cultural differences
between regions.173
Countries enjoy the autonomy to pass laws consistent with both
the ideological and cultural principles that have been ingrained into
the particular state throughout its history and are unlikely to waive
that right without a clear motive. For example, Section II of this
Note illustrates how the European data protection foundation arose
subsequent to the privacy violations that occurred during World War
II. In contrast, Latin America, with the historical prevalence of nondemocratic regimes, developed the concept of habeas data to promote free flow of communication, which is said to promote democracy.174 While there are also divides between individual countries
within the same region, it is logical, for purposes of this limited example, to characterize the regions as distinct collective units.
The second alternative is to pass a regional data protection convention in Latin America. While this may seem like the ideal solution, the current environment in Latin America gives little reason for
optimism regarding a regional data protection convention. A Latin
American data protection convention would require widespread participation by the OAS Members. While the OAS was relatively active in entering into a number of conventions and bilateral agreements in the 1970’s and 80’s, the OAS has entered into only five
171
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conventions since 2002.175 However, one may look to the recent
signing of the Convention on Protecting the Human Rights of Older
Persons in an attempt to prove Latin American States’ restored willingness for regional cooperation.176 However, it is premature, with
only five signatories, to declare the Human Rights of Older Persons
Convention a success.177 The natural inclination to give recent
events more weight than the holistic view is problematic because it
distorts the importance of the full overarching view. Therefore, time
is the only absolute indicator of whether this Convention will see
widespread adoption and spur further action by the Member States
in the near future.
A sub-regional multi-state group like the Mercosur178 would
have a greater probability of successfully passing a data protection
convention. The Mercosur States share geographical borders, close
cultural similarities, and have historically agreed to conduct that enhances the economic prosperity of the region through free trade.179
Even though the bloc only includes five states, the protection of the
more than 260 million people in those states would be an achievement in itself. Additionally, any data protection convention among
the Mercosur states may even inspire the five Associate Member
States to take action.
However, current conflicts within the trade bloc may hamper
any immediate action. Specifically, the bloc’s future viability has
been questioned in consideration of (1) the 2012 suspension of Paraguay; (2) the Uruguayan-Argentinian conflict that led to Uruguay
signing a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement with the
175
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26, 2015).
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U.S.; (3) Venezuela calling for a transition from the bloc’s economic
emphasis to social issues; and (4) the continued trade disputes between Argentina and Brazil.180
The direct implications of Mercosur agreeing to a data protection standard would benefit the region, but fall short of creating a
minimum data protection standard across the whole region. Furthermore, all Mercosur Members, with the exception of Venezuela, have
already passed domestic data protection laws. While action by the
Union of South American Nations (USAN) would have a more farreaching impact, the dilemma of widespread adoption, which the
OAS historically struggles with, would have to be considered. A regional convention may become a realistic option in the future, but it
is unlikely to succeed at present.
SECTION VI: JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
The American Convention provides the IACtHR with tools to
enforce a minimum data protection standard across Latin America.
However, the IACtHR must be careful to act only within its express
authority when interpreting and enforcing the American Convention. The IACtHR enjoys both adjudicatory and advisory jurisdiction.181
A.

Adjudicatory Jurisdiction
The IACtHR maintains contentious jurisdiction over the Member States of the American Convention.182 Alleged victims submit
complaints of state violations to the Commission, which may then
work with the state to resolve the potential violation itself, reject the
complaint, or submit the case to the IACtHR.183 The IACtHR is limited in its interpretation of the American Convention by the specific
facts introduced in the case before it.184 The IACtHR has found that
it is merely responsible for protecting the victims by penalizing the
guilty state and should not look to resolve abstract questions in the
180
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case.185 To that end, the IACtHR may impose monetary penalties on
violating states or order the state to repair the victims subject to the
particulars drawn out in the IACtHR’s decision. States must respect
the IACtHR’s judgment and they almost always do.186
While there are definitive limits to the IACtHR’s contentious jurisdiction, the IACtHR and IACHR still have practical options to
help implement a minimum data protection standard in Latin America. Millions of people are online in Latin American countries that
do not have comprehensive data protection laws. While the data is
not public, it is reasonable to assume that at least one of the hundreds
of claims brought before the Commission, especially in consideration of the recent popularization of the topic by the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, will address data protection.187 It is
of utmost importance that the Commission refers the case to the
Court. The burden then shifts to the Court to find the violation of the
Convention and to punish the state accordingly for either failing to
create a data protection structure to protect its citizens or failing to
enforce the previously enacted domestic data protection law.188
However, the coordination between the two human rights bodies is
challenging, even though they have a common objective, because
they have met only eight times since the creation of the human rights
bodies.189
Article 1(1) of the American Convention requires the states “to
respect the rights and freedoms recognized herein and to ensure to
185
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all persons subject to their jurisdiction the free and full exercise of
those rights and freedoms.”190 Moreover, Article 2 addresses the
synchronization of States’ domestic laws and actions with the provisions of the American Convention.191 Additionally, the IACtHR
has interpreted Article 2 to apply an affirmative obligation that requires the state actors to protect against reasonably foreseeable third
party human rights violations.192 The IACtHR has repeatedly addressed the States’ responsibility to align their domestic law with
the obligations set out by the American Convention.193 The Court
has also found that a state violates a victim’s Conventional rights,
pursuant to Articles 8 and 25, when it fails to provide effective recourse.194 It is therefore the Inter-American Human Rights Bodies’
responsibility to use its resources to compel a violating state to conform its behavior to the American Convention in order to protect
individual victims.
A former president of the IACtHR claims the “international jurisdictional decisions should serve as interpretation guidelines for
the domestic courts.”195 Accordingly, a number of high-level domestic courts have adjudicated, and governments have legislated, in
accordance with the IACtHR’s decisions.196 For example, the Supreme Court of Argentina first held that the domestic court’s inter-
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pretation of law must consider the relevant decisions by the IACtHR.197 There are a number of countries that not only consider the
IACtHR’s perspective, but also legally bind their respective states
to the Court’s interpretation of those human rights norms.198 Some
critics may nevertheless contest that one adjudicatory decision by
the IACtHR against a single state is unlikely to create a minimum
data protection standard across Latin America. However, states that
have not legally bound themselves to follow the strict interpretations
of the Court may pass and enforce a domestic data protection law to
preempt any future penalties by the Court.
B.

Advisory Jurisdiction
The Court should use its advisory authority199 to establish a minimum data protection standard in Latin America. The adjudicatory
jurisdiction provides the Court with a more expansive jurisdiction
than the Court’s advisory authority, which is subject to the unpredictability of petitioner’s claims and the Commission’s subsequent
claim bifurcation process.200 Furthermore, the Court’s advisory
opinions are not constricted by the specific facts of a petitioner’s
case.201 Instead, the Court may publish advisory opinions on any
topic submitted to it by a qualified entity, such as the Commission.202 These submissions allow the IACtHR to address topics it
197
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may not otherwise consider under its contentious jurisdiction.203 For
example, at the request of the Commission, the IACtHR published
an advisory opinion on whether Peru’s domestic death penalty constitutional provision complied with the American Convention.204
The IACtHR permitted the request for the advisory opinion based
on the Commission’s International Responsibility for the Promulgation and Enforcement of Laws.205
The Court’s advisory opinions clarify, by way of judicial interpretation, particular principles of law.206 Specifically, the advisory
proceedings “make important contributions to the conceptual evolution of the international law of human rights.”207 Accordingly, the
IACtHR has repeatedly used this jurisdictional measure to publish
advisory opinions that reinforce the independent foundation of international human rights law.208 However, the Court cannot use its
advisory jurisdiction to require states to reform domestic laws.209
The Court’s advisory opinions are not binding like the Court’s adjudicatory opinions. Yet, the advisory opinions have nevertheless
proven influential and impacted both domestic and international
law.210 For example, the IACtHR issued an advisory opinion that
has an absolute right to request advisory opinions of the IACtHR regarding the
interpretation of the American Convention).
203
“Other Treaties” Subject to the Advisory Jurisdiction of the Court (Art. 64
American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-1/82, Inter-Am.
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determined a Guatemalan death penalty reservation was in violation
of the American Convention.211 Guatemala was under no legal obligation to stop the execution, but its Supreme Court complied with
the advisory opinion even after it had petitioned the IACtHR to decline to render the advisory opinion in the first place.212 Advisory
opinions published by international tribunals have been interpreted
to contribute to an international common law and have been used to
resolve doctrinal differences.213
The IACtHR has been willing to issue advisory opinions to “address controversial or developing issues in international law.”214
Furthermore, states have been increasingly willing to petition the
IACtHR for advisory opinions on issues without clear precedence.
For example, Mexico requested an advisory opinion on a contentious matter that arose when the U.S. sentenced Mexican nationals
to death without informing them of their rights to confer to their national consulate pursuant to the Vienna Convention.215 The IACtHR
published an advisory opinion, where it interpreted the relevant provisions of the Vienna Convention, even though there was a pending
controversy between the U.S. and Mexico.216
The focus of this article hinges on the need and justification for
the IACtHR to act in order to repair the human rights gap, regarding
the absence of data protection laws in a number of Latin American
countries. However, the IACtHR will not pay attention to the need
to act if there is not a practical method to accomplish the proposed
action. The IACtHR should not hesitate to use its adjudicatory authority if an applicable data protection case arrives, but the more
practical course of action is to rely on its advisory authority to put
the region on notice of its expansive data protection interpretation.
It is reasonable to assume that a state or tribunal will seek an advi-
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sory opinion from the IACtHR on the issue of data protection because of the increasing prevalence of the international processing of
information contrasted with the current patchwork and gaps of Latin
American data protection laws will likely hit an apex of uncertainty.
SECTION VII: THE COURT IS JUSTIFIED IN ADVANCING MINIMUM
DATA PROTECTION STANDARD
The Inter-American Court is justified, pursuant to the right to
privacy enshrined in the American Convention, to require all States
that have accepted the Court’s jurisdiction to safeguard their citizens’ data in a manner supported by the general principles of statutory interpretation and comparative interpretations by other international bodies.
A.

Treaty Interpretation
The general principles of treaty interpretation support the IACtHR’s establishing a minimum data protection standard. Article 31
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties requires that a
treaty be interpreted “in good faith in accordance with the ordinary
meaning to be given to [its] terms.”217 However, the Vienna Convention’s modified textual approach of treaty interpretation is of
minimal practical use here because human rights instruments are
commonly drafted with considerable generality, which provides the
interpreter with the impossible task of determining the drafter’s intent.218 The IACtHR has supported the Vienna Convention’s notion
that “the ‘ordinary meaning’ of terms [of a treaty] cannot of itself
become the sole rule, for it must always be considered within its
context and in particular, in the light of the object and purpose of the
treaty.”219 Thus, judicial bodies responsible for interpreting the treaties may use their “authority by weighing the conflicting interests of
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the parties in the context of contemporary regional or global concerns.”220
The American Convention was intended to protect the people in
the region from human rights violations by public and private actors
alike.221 It is therefore reasonable for the Court to interpret the relevant Articles to protect the peoples’ human rights in the face of technological innovation. Some may contest that data protection was not
considered by the drafters of the American Convention and thus falls
outside the constructs of the document’s original intent. Even so,
such an interpretation would not go against any general or specific
purpose of the treaty. It is reasonable to interpret the purpose of Articles 11 and 13 as being designed to protect privacy and thus data
as an extension of the same.
The IACtHR has strong support to decide on the issue of data
protection based on the plain language of the American Convention.
While any interpretation is subject to critique, the language of the
relevant Articles, in consideration of the Court’s past interpretations,
would make the inclusion of data protection altogether reasonable.
Article 11 flatly prohibits “arbitrary or abusive interference with [a
person’s] private life, his family, his home, or his correspondence,
or of unlawful attacks on his honor or reputation.” 222 As referenced
above, the term private life has been interpreted as broader in scope
than mere privacy.
B.

International Bodies
The IACtHR should enforce a minimum data protection standard because other international human rights bodies have held that
comparable clauses establish a person’s right to data protection.
While the IACtHR is not bound by the words of the ECtHR, any
cross-referencing between judicial bodies not only “enhances the
weight of the decision by invoking multiple precedents, but [also]
helps produce greater conformity of jurisprudence among the different human rights bodies.”223 The ECtHR describes the European
Convention of Human Rights as a “living instrument, which must
220
221
222
223
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be interpreted in the light of present day conditions.”224 The European Court argues “that state law and practice cannot remain static
while European standards evolve towards greater human rights protection.”225 The IACtHR has historically relied heavily on interpretations made by the ECtHR.226
For example, In Amann v. Switzerland,227 the ECtHR held that
the State violated the petitioner’s right to privacy pursuant to Article
8 of the Convention when a government agency created and stored
a card on the petitioner, which alleged that he had “contact with the
Russian embassy” and conducted “business of various kinds with
the company.”228 The Court reasoned that the storage of the card in
the instant case was enough to find that the State interfered with the
Petitioner’s private life in violation of Article 8.229 In making its decision in this case, the ECtHR stated “that the term ‘private life’
must not be interpreted restrictively.”230 Similarly, the IACtHR
should employ a wide scope approach while interpreting the American Convention for purposes of establishing a data protection standard in the region.
SECTION VIII: THE IACTHR SHOULD PLAY A MORE ACTIVE ROLE
IN THE REGION
The IACtHR should take a more progressive approach in its interpretation of the human rights listed in the American Convention.
The Court’s tradition of narrowly tailoring its interpretation of the
Convention may be changing with recent Court jurisprudence addressing the application of the Convention to modern human rights
issues.231
224
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Article 26 of the American Convention promotes economic, social, and cultural rights by requiring “[t]he State Parties undertake
to adopt measures, both internally and through international cooperation, especially those of an economic and technical nature, with a
view to achieving progressively, by legislation or other appropriate
means.”232 However, the IACtHR has been relatively unassertive in
promoting these rights.
Critics take issue with a more expansive interpretation of the
American Convention.233 They point to the fact that the Convention
was adopted in a time of turmoil when the Member States refused
to safeguard its citizens from human rights violations. Those advocating a limited application of the Convention argue that the Court
should interpret the American Convention under the complementarity doctrine, which is referenced in the Convention’s Preamble and
Article 46.234 This position is consistent with the Court, which has
specifically stated that the supervision of the IACtHR is complimentary to the State’s domestic laws.235 In short, the function of the
Court is to achieve regional peace and justice and not to be a regional
legislator.236
Member States have revoked their submission to the Court’s
compulsive jurisdiction in the past and some States claim that an
expansive interpretation of the Convention will increase the risk of
additional States following suit. Nevertheless, there will always be
a fragile balance in any multilateral treaty between maintaining
widespread membership and conducting the duties that the treaty
was intended to perform. To succumb to potential objecting states
at the cost of protecting individual’s human rights across the region
would be to stray from the purpose of the Court.
The failure of the Court to interpret the Convention in light of
present day conditions will result in a widening gap in human rights
protections over time with the development of technology, which
232
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harbors new ways to violate individual’s human rights. The issue of
data protection provides the Court with an opportunity to inform and
even warn the region that the Court will remain relevant and vigilant
in protecting against modern human rights violations.
The Court has shown signs that it may use a modern understanding of data protection in the global human rights context. For example, in the case of Atala v. Chile, the IACtHR held that Chile violated
the petitioner’s right to private life under Article 11 of the Convention when it investigated the lesbian couples upon a visit to their
home.237 The IACtHR has lagged behind the ECtHR, which first
found that the right to privacy enshrined in the European Convention
included the protection of homosexuals in the early 1980’s.238 However, the Atala decision may prove to become the beginning of the
Court’s expansive interpretation of Article 11. Thereby, opening the
door for the Court to address the fundamental right of data protection under the Convention’s right to privacy.
SECTION IX: CONCLUSION
With the end of World War II came the start of a conversation
about privacy. That conversation has since developed into a discussion about the state’s responsibility to protect an individual’s personal data. Many countries now interpret data protection to be a fundamental right. Present day European data protection laws would
have required a data controller to gain permission from my Grandpa
and his family before storing their personal information in a database. However, a data controller would not be prohibited from storing my Grandpa’s personal information in some Latin American
countries because those states have failed to pass or enforce comprehensive data protection laws.
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The issues surrounding data protection have played a significant
role in Latin America and the associated risks will prove ever more
evident as countries in the region continue to develop. Latin Americans are in need of an obligatory data protection framework across
the region. The IACtHR is the only feasible actor that has the authority and respect to require action by the Latin American states.
Finally, the IACtHR is justified in acting to set a minimum data protection standard to resolve the need. Any delay by the IACtHR to
act will only lead to more human rights violations.

